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THESIS

**NATO'S NEW MEMBERS:
WHAT CAN THEY LEARN FROM SPAIN?**

by

Alicia G. Weed

June 1999

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Second Reader:

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**NATO'S NEW MEMBERS:
WHAT CAN THEY LEARN FROM SPAIN?**

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Captain, United States Army
B.S., Southwest Texas State University, 1981

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 1999

ABSTRACT

When Spain joined NATO, the country was very different from those initial signatories or even those that aligned themselves with the Organization after the original treaty establishment of 1949. Like the three countries currently embarking on NATO integration, Spain was a newly formed democracy still in the process of democratic consolidation when the NATO accession papers were filed. However, in contrast to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, for several decades Spain had looked to the west and even though not a member of NATO, Spain maintained close ties with several NATO countries.

Even with these differences, there is still much to be learned from Spain's integration into NATO. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland should carefully study the path Spain followed into NATO and determine what may or may not suit them from this experience in their current undertaking. Can Spain serve as an example for the three new members? A look at the differences and similarities between Spain and the three may provide insight for the way Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland proceed in their integration process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
A. SPAIN PRIOR TO NATO INTEGRATION	4
1. International Situation	4
2. Transitional Political Situation.....	9
3. Domestic Situation	11
B. RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY AND POLAND	14
II. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS IN SPAIN OF NATO ENTRY	17
A. CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY	17
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MILITARY	22
1. Background.....	22
2. Modernization	24
C. NEW ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE MILITARY	26
III. SPAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO	29
A. MISSIONS	33
1. The Gulf War.....	33
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	34
B. STAFF REQUIREMENTS	36
1. Senior Positions.....	36
2. Further Staff Obligations.....	36
C. FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS	37
IV. THE THREE NEW MEMBERS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM SPAIN	39
A. THE NEW MEMBERS.....	39
B. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC INFLUENCE	51
C. DOMESTIC SITUATION.....	56
D. MILITARY SITUATION.....	57
E. MORE LESSONS LEARNED	58
V. CONCLUSIONS	63
BIBLIOGRAPHY	69
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	77

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fifty years ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created as a means of common defense against the occurrence of another World War. The entry of Spain into the Atlantic Alliance should be of great interest to those countries contemplating entrance into the structure of NATO. Spain's membership was a process that began in 1949 but took more than thirty years to complete. It was not until 1982, when Spain submitted the Instrument of Ratification in Washington, DC, which was the final phase necessary for accession into NATO, that Spain was integrated. This step was the beginning of a relationship that would change and evolve over the next sixteen years to the complete participation Spain enjoys today as a member of all committees within the NATO family.

Today, there are three new members of the Organization: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In July of 1997, the NATO Heads of State and Government invited these countries to begin negotiations for accession into the NATO family and enjoy the security from external coercion or aggression as part of a NATO guarded Europe. Less than twenty-five years ago, Spain was in a situation similar to the three new NATO members. It was a newly formed democracy trying to establish its position in Western Europe. While still attempting to consolidate its democratic institutions and throw off the shackles of the authoritarian government it had lived under for almost four decades, Spain realized the necessity for professionalizing the military and solidifying civilian control of all aspects of the armed forces.

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland recently left the restraints of the communist regime and joined the ranks of democratic nations. This thesis will attempt to demonstrate the similarities that exist between the three new members today and Spain at the time of its accession into the Atlantic Alliance and what lessons can be learned from Spain for the three.

I. INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created as a means of common defense against the occurrence of another World War. According to the *NATO Handbook* the union of the United States, Canada and the ten European countries in 1949, “brought into being an Alliance of independent countries with a common interest in maintaining peace and defending their freedom through political solidarity and adequate military defence to deter, and if necessary, repel all possible forms of aggression against them... the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries.”¹

During the Cold War period and after, NATO expanded several times. The entry of Spain into the Atlantic Alliance should be of great interest to those countries contemplating entrance into the structure of NATO. Spain’s admittance was a process that began in 1949 but took more than thirty years to complete. It was not until 1982, when Spain submitted the Instrument of Ratification in Washington, DC, which was the final step necessary for accession into NATO, that Spain was integrated. This step was the beginning of a relationship that would change and evolve over the next sixteen years to the complete participation Spain enjoys today as a member of all committees within the NATO family.

¹ *NATO Handbook*. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, October 1995), p. 17.

Today, there are three new members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In July of 1997, the NATO Heads of State and Government invited these countries to begin negotiations for accession into the NATO family and enjoy the security from external coercion or aggression as part of a NATO guarded Europe.² These three would do well to look at the lessons that Spain learned through its integration into NATO (such as the effect NATO integration had on the consolidation of democracy and the need for civilian control of the armed forces), the great success it enjoys today as a democratic nation and determine how these learned lessons can be applied to their countries so that they too can enjoy this type of success.

Less than twenty-five years ago, up to the time of Generalissimo Franco's death and the end of his dictatorship, Spain was in a situation similar to the three new NATO members. It was a newly formed democracy trying to establish its position in Western Europe. While still attempting to consolidate its democratic institutions and throw off the shackles of the authoritarian government it had lived under for almost four decades, Spain realized the necessity for professionalizing the military and solidifying civilian control of all aspects of the armed forces. In this same manner, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland recently left the restraints of the communist regime and joined the ranks of democratic nations. This thesis clearly demonstrates the similarities that exist between the three new members today and Spain at the time of its accession into the Atlantic Alliance.

² NATO Basic Fact Sheet: Ratification of Accession Protocol. Available on the internet at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/access.htm>, March 1, 1999.

The first chapter examines the international and domestic situation in Spain prior to the accession into the Atlantic Alliance. From this perspective it moves on to how Spain's political situation may have relevance and implications for the three countries currently embarking on NATO integration (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).

Chapter II reviews the consolidation of democracy in Spain and its entry into NATO. The connection between Spain at the time of NATO accession and the three nations today is most noticeable when looked at from the perspective of the need to consolidate the new democratic governments. In late 1982, even after the accession papers had been filed and approved by Spain and the other fifteen members, Spain 'froze' in place and never becoming a member of NATO became a distinct possibility. To continue the chapter is a discussion of the process to professionalize the military and of the new roles and missions for the military after the transition to democracy and the integration into NATO.

Chapter III considers the current situation of Spain in NATO, with the requirements for missions and staffing that NATO imposes on its members. After so many years of being the "Spanish Model" and not actively participating in the integrated military command structure of NATO, the end of the Cold War brought about certain changes in NATO's organization. These changes caused Spain to reconsider their absence from the integrated military command structure. The entry into the command structure meant that revisions had to be made in the organization of the Spanish military, with the commensurate costs to be paid.

After a brief background of the three new members' transitions to democracy, Chapter IV is an examination of the similarities and differences in both the international and domestic situations between Spain at the time of its accession into NATO and Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland today. The final chapter is a summary of what has been learned from the Spanish case and some preliminary recommendations for the three new members.

A. SPAIN PRIOR TO NATO INTEGRATION

1. International Situation

At the inception of NATO in 1949, Spain was an isolated country on the Iberian Peninsula. Even though it was geographically a part of Western Europe, the contact between Spain and the rest of Europe was minimal. Spain did not actively participate in the Second World War and at the conclusion of the war, was not only not invited to join NATO but was specifically excluded. Under the authoritarian regime of Generalissimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, Spain did not fit the mold for the ideal type of country that the Atlantic Alliance wanted as a member. Having an anti-communist government and a centrally located (between Portugal and France, two original NATO members) geographical position could not overcome the leaning toward a fascist regime or the lack of a democratic government. As the original Washington Treaty states,

The North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 brought into being an Alliance of independent countries with a common interest in maintaining peace and defending their freedom through political solidarity and adequate military defense to deter and, if necessary, repel all possible forms of aggression against them. Created within the framework of Article 51 of the United

Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective defense, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries. ...

NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.³

However, the lack of democracy was just one small part of the case against Spain. There were other countries within the NATO family that did not have democratic governments at the time of accession and that had not prevented them from becoming a member. Lawrence S. Kaplan counters the belief that Franco's dictatorship was what prevented Spain's entry into NATO. He states that "The fact of dictatorship itself did not bar Spain before 1982; Salazar's Portugal was no more democratic than its Iberian neighbor, and Greece under the colonels in the 1970s was hardly a model of democratic governance. But Franco's fascism in support of Hitler's Germany was a burden that kept the nation out of the alliance for a generation."⁴ France especially, spoke out strongly against Spain becoming a NATO member because of the tie Spain had with Hitler and Germany. (This is an ironic point, considering Germany became a member of NATO in 1955, almost thirty years before Spain). As mentioned before, Portugal was also not a democratic society when NATO first came into existence. The citizens were living under a dictatorship at the time of their NATO membership. However, during World War II, Portugal sided with the allies and permitted the use of

³ *NATO Handbook*. (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), p. 17.

⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan. "Historical Aspects" ed. Jeffery Simon *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 30.

the Portuguese facilities in the Azores. This response to the needs of the allies as well as the actual need for these geo-strategic assets caused Portugal to be considered favorably when NATO was formed.⁵

Along these same lines, Spain was not even allowed to become a full member of the United Nations until December 14, 1955 (coincidentally the same date as Hungary's entrance into the UN). France, the United States, and the United Kingdom in 1946, signed a declaration speaking out against Spain's fascist leanings. Additionally, that same year, France closed the border leading to Spain. The UN then decided in December, 1946 to condemn Franco's regime for its association with Hitler and insisted that all United Nation ambassadors be pulled from the country. This order was later rescinded, and 1948 saw the reopening of the border between France and Spain.

Even though the issue of Franco's support of Hitler seemed to condemn Spain to isolation from the rest of Europe and the United States, the Cold War and the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately led the U.S. to approach Spain as an ally. The U.S. wanted to establish a military presence in the area and needed these geo-strategic assets for its military contingency planning. Franco wanted to align himself with the U.S. as a way of ingratiating Spain with the rest of Europe. The United States determined that, even though at the present time the democracy issue was insurmountable with respect to NATO admission, that need not prevent the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the U. S. and Spain. The Iberian Peninsula was of major strategic importance for the U.S. with its access to the Atlantic Ocean, the

⁵ Information on Portugal provided by Professor Thomas Bruneau, during discussions with author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 13 April 1999.

Mediterranean Sea, and Africa. This positioning would allow the United States to maintain a forward presence that much closer to the Soviet Union and provide the U.S. with dominion of the seaward approaches. "In 1949, the first American loans were granted to Spain. In the following year, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the United States would be ready to sponsor a resolution in the United Nations to regularize Spain's position vis-à-vis the international organization."⁶ The Korean War, with the U.S. need for more forward placed military bases further encouraged a greater cultivation of the relationship and the United States soon began ongoing diplomatic relations. Any American hesitation about Franco's fascist preferences was overcome by the threat of communist expansion.

Spain and the United States moved into full negotiations, and in September of 1953 signed the first official agreements (known jointly as the Pact of Madrid) for the United States to build military installations on Spanish soil. Under this three part collection of agreements, the United States provided financial and defense assistance to Spain and Spain would provide the United States prime strategic locations from which to launch its military forces if this ever became necessary. These executive agreements were extended for twenty-two years until September of 1975.⁷ These arrangements resulted in almost \$1.9 billion US dollars in assistance to Spain between 1949 and

⁶ Arnold Hottinger, 1974. *Spain in Transition: Franco's Regime*. (The Washington Papers, vol.II, no.18. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications), p. 13.

⁷ For more information on the agreements see Robert Rinehart and Jo Ann Browning Seeley. *Spain, a Country Study*. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990), 52. and the Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Ninety-fourth Congress Second Session on H.R. 14940 Role of Spain in U.S. Defense Planning Provisions of the Treaty and Implementing Legislation. June 8&16, 1976 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 109.

1975.⁸ In return, the United States was permitted to build “three Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases (Torrejón, Zaragoza, and Morón) and one Naval facility (at Rota), as well as a series of other military communications facilities throughout Spain.”⁹ This way the United States had new strategic locations on Spanish territory with access to the Mediterranean. In 1975, a new document was agreed upon, the *Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and Spain*. These negotiations continued until a comprehensive treaty was agreed to by both countries. A portion of the economic aid that the United States provided to Spain in exchange for strategic locations was designated for military modernization. The improvements fostered by the financial aid to the Spanish Armed Forces would refine their capabilities to a level approaching NATO competence. Although this would not make a difference while Franco was in power, it would cast a more favorable light on the country as being militarily prepared when it came time for NATO accession.

This relationship between the United States and Spain encouraged a greater acceptance of Franco’s rule by the rest of the democratic world but it still did not dispel the distrust of his authoritarian regime. The Franco regime would never be fully accepted by the countries of Western Europe. As Arnold Hottinger stated in his book *Spain in Transition: Franco’s Regime* “In general, it may be said that 1953 permitted a

⁸ Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Ninety-fourth Congress Second Session on H.R. 14940 Role of Spain in U.S. Defense Planning Provisions of the Treaty and Implementing Legislation. June 8&16, 1976 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 110.

⁹ Emilio A. Rodriguez, “Atlanticism and Europeanism,” in *Spain’s Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives* eds. Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 59.

normalization of Spain's relations with the outside world, ... Spain has become respectable, but has acquired no friends."¹⁰

2. Transitional Political Situation

In the early 1970s, Franco organized the government of Spain in such a way that his regime would continue after he was gone. He placed loyal leaders in key positions to secure continuity for the regime. Then, in the last days of 1973, the Spanish Prime Minister, the man Franco had hand picked to shape the destiny of Spain, Luis Carrero Blanco, was assassinated. The future of Spain as Franco's legacy was no longer assured.

During the decades of Franco's dictatorship, Don Juan, who was the third son of the king deposed by the Spanish Civil War, maintained a dialogue with Franco. Don Juan believed himself to be the rightful heir to the throne of Spain, after his father Alfonso XIII died. Initially, these talks concerned his return to the throne where he believed he should reign. As dictator, Franco did not see the need for any change in his regime. From his exiled position in Switzerland, Don Juan spoke out against the Franco regime and declared that Spain must be returned to a monarchy. As a monarchy, Don Juan believed he would then return to 'his' throne. In order to dispel the stigma of being labeled an authoritarian regime, Franco agreed with Don Juan that Spain should once again be a monarchy. In 1947, Franco declared Spain a monarchy (but reserved the right to name its ruler) and published the law of succession without naming a king. This act frustrated Don Juan, who once again spoke out against Franco

¹⁰ Hottinger, p. 20.

stating “The enmity by which Spain finds itself menaced from the outside [it was the period of boycott by the United Nations] springs mainly from the fact of the presence of Franco...who now intends to extend his dictatorship for his lifetime.”¹¹ Seeming to accept the fact that Franco would never permit his return to the throne, follow on discussions between Don Juan and Franco concerned the education and future of Don Juan’s son, Don Juan Carlos. In 1969, Franco decided that Don Juan Carlos had completed the training and preparation necessary, after attending three service academies, to prevail as Franco’s successor. In July of 1969, Franco named Don Juan Carlos as his successor as Head of State of Spain.¹² Six years later, in November of 1975, General Franco died and his dictatorship was passed on to his successor. King Don Juan Carlos de Borbón was announced in November of 1975 as the new ruler of Spain.

The new King had the right and authority to continue the regime with very few changes. However instead of retaining the authoritarian based government, King Juan Carlos I quietly transformed Spain into a constitutional monarchy, embedded with liberal democratic principles. At the side of the King, helping implement the establishment of democratic institutions, was Franco's former Secretary General of the National Movement, Adolfo Suárez. After nearly 40 years of living subjugated to a dictatorial regime under General Franco, these two men assisted Spain as it began the transition to democratic freedom and continued upon its journey out of isolationism.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 47.

¹² Ibid.

Political parties came out of seclusion and evolved into major contenders in the running of the government.

3. Domestic Situation

a. Institutions

During Franco's regime, there were no lawful political parties. He is quoted in Arnold Hottinger's *Spain in Transition: Franco's Regime* as saying "Political parties are not a constructive solution for opening the way towards a true, orderly and efficient democracy in Spain, and they cannot be tolerated. But the exclusion of political parties certainly does not mean the exclusion of legitimate contrasts of opinion, critical analysis of the solutions proposed by the Government, the formulation of programs and methods which may contribute to the advancement of the community."¹³ This complete restriction forced certain parties, such as the communist and socialist parties into a clandestine role rather than dissolve entirely. The only legal political organizations were government controlled, such as the National Movement. The National Movement was a coalition of right wing political groups sanctioned by Franco's regime.

Carlos Arias Navarro, the last Prime Minister appointed by General Franco, continued as head of the first government after the death of Franco. Arias Navarro was re-appointed as Prime Minister by King Juan Carlos in 1975 essentially because the King considered the need for continuity as a first priority rather than because Arias

¹³ Ibid, p. 39-40.

Navarro was the best man for the job. In actuality, Arias had numerous difficulties dealing with members of the new government, primarily because of his connection to the previous authoritarian regime. No one was convinced that his position was truly for reform and not simply a continuation of the status quo with minor changes. There was a sense of distrust that inhibited the move toward democracy. By June of 1976, Arias was out and the King had appointed a new prime minister, Adolfo Suárez. Along with this new appointment came the legalization of political parties. The legalization of parties did not extend to the Partido Comunista Español (PCE) or Communist Party. This would not occur until Easter weekend of the following year and then would cause problems with the military and the followers of the previous regime. With the legalization, numerous political parties appeared on the scene. These parties ranged from the extreme right wing Alianza Popular (AP) to the left leaning Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). Centered in the middle was the Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD), a coalition of parties that united together to oppose the extremist groups from both the left and right wings. It has been said by many that the strength of the UCD was in the leadership of Suárez and not the rest of the party.

In June of 1977, the first democratic election in over forty years was held to elect a parliament. The voters demonstrated their dislike of extremist rhetoric by electing the UCD, as mentioned before, a very middle of the road party. "The UCD received 166 out of the 350, or 47 percent of the seats in the Lower House."¹⁴ The

¹⁴ Jonathan Story. "Spain's External Relations Redefined" Richard Gillespie, Fernando Rodrigo, and Jonathan Story, eds., *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 34.

primary task of this new parliament was to draft a new constitution for Spain. This constitution was completed and approved overwhelmingly (approximately 88 percent) by the voters through a referendum on December 6th, 1978. Soon thereafter, another general election was held that reestablished the hold the UCD had on the country and demonstrated just how pleased the voters were with the UCD. This was the party that would lead Spain into the membership rolls of NATO.

b. Economics

During the interim between Franco's death and Spain's initial entry into NATO numerous domestic changes occurred. In the quest to promote democracy, it is frequently believed that Spain became strong economically and continued to rise, after the transition toward democracy. In fact, Spain was economically quite stable prior to the demise of Franco. "Spain's real growth averaged 7 percent per year from 1965 to 1974, but hovered at about 2 percent in subsequent years."¹⁵ The four-year period from 1973 (during Franco's regime) to 1977 (new democratic regime) saw tremendous shifts in the stability of the economy. One component of this shift in stability can be attributed to the two oil crises of the 1970s which affected the economies of not only European nations but economies world wide. However, Spain's instability was

¹⁵ William L. Heiberg, *THE SIXTEENTH NATION: Spain's Role in NATO*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 12.

magnified by "a virtually exclusive preoccupation with the politics of democratization and the drafting of a new political system."¹⁶

- Unemployment rates rose by more than two percentage points, from four percent of the available workforce being unemployed in 1974 to more than 6 percent or over 800,000 available workers not having jobs.
- Inflation rates increased by more than eleven percentage points from a modest 15 percent to more than 26 percent.
- International debt multiplied to more than 14 billion dollars (US) in 1977, from what David Jordan in his Foreign Policy Report calls "practically nonexistent."¹⁷

B. RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY AND POLAND

The three countries that are the newest members of NATO, having deposited their Instruments of Ratification in Washington, D.C. in March of 1999, are Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. These three should look to Spain and understand that the difficulties encountered before and after NATO membership may also face their countries. Certain questions should be addressed in order to get an idea of advantages and disadvantages of NATO membership.

Why did Spain decide it wanted to join NATO?

¹⁶ Benjamin Martin, "The Economy" in *Spain, A Country Study*, eds. Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, 2nd edition, Country Studies-Area Handbook Series, DA Pam 550-179 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990), p. 144.

¹⁷ Numerical facts are taken from David C. Jordan, *Spain, the Monarchy and the Atlantic Community* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and Washington, D.C.: Institute Foreign Policy Analysis, INC, 1979), p. 35.

Was NATO just a means to enter the European Economic Community?

Why did Socialist party (PSOE) change its stance on NATO after it had been elected?

Was Spain hoping to control its military through NATO membership?

These questions as they pertain to Spain will be addressed in the following chapters.

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are joining NATO less than a decade after their transitions to democracy in much the same way as Spain did 17 years ago. Even though each country transformed itself in its own way, without a doubt the peaceful passage from one government to the next with no violence associated with the changes, is the greatest similarity between the four nations.

While Spain was eventually able to reconcile itself to the different aspects of NATO membership, it would be more appropriate for the three new members to have a complete understanding and agreement with all of NATO's policies before integration. Since March of 1999 marked the enlargement of NATO, this may no longer be a possibility but Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland need to ensure that the policies of NATO coincide with the policies of their countries in order to prevent dissention within their populations like Spain experienced in the 1980s.

II. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS IN SPAIN OF NATO ENTRY

What makes the situation in Spain so uncertain is that beyond the competence of the present government. It is not that some, perhaps even the king, don't want to institute fundamental changes. It is that they will be opposed by vested interests who retain too much power in the old system to let it be removed by reforms. Thus the government, unable to satisfy the growing demands for reform may be repressive and, under the conditions now developing in Spain, almost certainly violent.¹⁸

Professor William Braasch Watson

On the 30th of May in 1982, Spain deposited the Instrument of Ratification for NATO membership in Washington and became the first country to join the Atlantic Alliance in more than twenty-five years. Even though it was seven years after the end of the authoritarian regime of Franco, this initial entry would ultimately solidify Spain's grasp on democracy in much the same way that Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland want to solidify their new democratic governments.

A. CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

The Socialist Party (PSOE) came to power for the first time in the fall of 1982. Javier Solana, a key player in the Socialist Party in 1981, verbalized the campaign slogan for the PSOE all through the pre-election phase "Nuestra postura es rotunda. Estamos radicalmente en contra del ingreso de España en la OTAN."¹⁹ The opposition (PSOE)

¹⁸ William Braasch Watson, Professor MIT, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, regarding the Treaty Between the United States and Spain, March 12, 1976. Found in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Ninety-fourth Congress Second Session on H.R. 14940 Role of Spain in U.S. Defense Planning Provisions of the Treaty and Implementing Legislation. June 8&16, 1976 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 8.

¹⁹ José Virgilio Colchero, "España acabará en la estructura militar," *CRÓNICA ESPAÑA*, 3 Diciembre 1995, p. 2.

was very opposed to Spain joining NATO. However, knowing that their chances of retaining the majority were slim, the UCD government did not wait until after the next election, scheduled for the latter part of 1982, to proceed with NATO integration. By November of 1982 when the Socialist Party held the majority of the parliament, Spain was officially a member of NATO.

This fact did not sit well with the new government due to the belief that; first of all, Spain should not belong to any military organizations (this belief was seconded by the Communist party) and secondly, the previous government had not allowed the people any say in the decision of whether or not to join NATO. Because of this belief and because they had promised the people that put them in office, all military integration in NATO ceased. There would be no further participation until a referendum could be held, allowing the people to decide if Spain should continue in NATO. It was expected that Felipe González, as the new Prime Minister, and his party would conduct this referendum in a timely manner. However, four years passed before the referendum was held and in the interim González' 'Decalogue' on national security and defense was presented to the parliament. This *Ten Points On A Peace and Security Policy* outlined what González hoped to accomplish by means of a security policy. It also detailed his view of Spain's future in NATO.

- Continue the current relationship with NATO
- Do not enter the integrated military command structure of NATO
- Continue bilateral defense agreements with the United States
- Reduce US military presence in Spain
- Join the Western European Union
- Fortify bilateral Western European defense agreements
- Remove all nuclear weapons from Spanish soil (possibly sign Treaty of Non-Nuclear Proliferation)

- Regain Gibraltar
- Join international disarmament talks
- Discussion of a Joint Strategic Plan²⁰

This outline, it was believed, would facilitate the decision making on whether or not to remain in the Atlantic Alliance.

The delay in the referendum can be attributed to the change of heart that Felipe González and the PSOE experienced during their time in office. It was not that they were suddenly pro-NATO but that they finally realized that NATO membership was the way to become fully integrated into Western Europe. The PSOE understood that to be part of Western Europe, Spain must gain acceptance into the European Economic Community (EEC). This organization was the best way for Spain to thrive economically but the European Economic Community was not looking favorably at Spain (France and Greece, members of the EEC, feared competition in agricultural areas). Spain had been trying to become a member of the EEC since the death of Franco and was denied membership for many years for different reasons. The current government grasped the fact that pulling out of NATO would not enhance the likelihood of EEC membership and could possibly kill any possibility of imminent membership.²¹ As proof of the success of this strategy Spain was finally accepted into the European Community in January of 1986.

This was the time then, in 1986, with the Socialist Party still maintaining the majority, having won 184 seats of the available 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies, that the parliament decided to offer to the public the opportunity to vote on whether or not

²⁰ *Peace and Security Policies*, <http://www.docuweb.ca/SiSpain/english/foreign/peace.html>

²¹ Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel. *The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), p. 38.

Spain should remain in NATO. This was not required by the Constitution of 1978 but by allowing the voters to decide, no blame either way, for staying in NATO or leaving NATO, could be laid at the party's feet. Even though the official Socialist Party rhetoric had not changed, the government now began to encourage continued NATO participation as a means for Spain's trek toward acceptance in Western Europe.

The issue to be answered by the voters in the referendum was not a simple one. It consisted of three parts; an introductory statement, conditions and finally the question. As a whole, it was phrased in such a way that for many years to come altering Spain's association with NATO would be very difficult to change.

Preámbulo

El Gobierno considera conveniente para los intereses nacionales que España permanezca en la Alianza Atlántica y acuerda que dicha permanencia se establezca en los siguientes términos:

1. "La participación de España en la Alianza Atlántica no incluirá la participación en la estructura militar integrada.
2. "Se mantendrá la prohibición de instalar, almacenar o introducir armas nucleares en territorio español.
3. "Se procederá a la reducción progresiva de la presencia militar de los Estados Unidos en España.

Pregunta

¿Considera conveniente para España la permanencia en la alianza Atlántica, en los términos acordados por el Gobierno de la nación?²²

So the question that came before the people of Spain asked them, that if participation in NATO did not include participation in the integrated military command structure, and maintained a prohibition against nuclear weapons and continued a reduction of US military forces, then would they perhaps like for Spain to remain in NATO? Additionally, although not directly stated in the referendum wording, González implied

²² This was the form the referendum question took as presented in the Spanish newspaper. No byline, "1986:OTAN, 'sí'; estructura militar, 'no'..." *CRONICA Diario*, 3 Diciembre 1995, p. 3.

that by remaining in NATO, there would be a reduction in American troops on Spanish soil because with the security of NATO, Spain would not need as many American soldiers. This is an important point because the Spanish people did not think very highly of Americans and their intrusion on Spanish territory. "In a 1984 poll on NATO, a request for an opinion about the U.S. bases received a 70 percent negative result; among PSOE voters, the negative result was 76 percent. Asked on the eve of President Reagan's visit in 1985 if 'the U.S. and its president are loyal and sincere friends of Spain,' only 13 percent of the general public agreed; 74 percent disagreed."²³

On the 12th of March of 1986 the vote was conducted. Even though numerous conditions were made in the phrasing of the referendum to make it as appealing as possible to the greatest number of people, the count was close. By a slim margin of only 52.6 percent the referendum passed (with almost forty percent of the voting population opposed to remaining in NATO) and Spain settled into its own version of NATO membership.

²³ Maxwell and Spiegel, pp. 36-37.

B. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MILITARY

*We have the picture of the Spanish military as being very involved in Spanish politics. Franco was a general and frequently wore a uniform. Actually, in point of fact, the Spanish military have tended, for some years past, to stand very aloof from day to-day politics.*²⁴

Harry E. Bergold Jr.

1. Background

During Franco's regime the military was the power he used to control the country. Internal threat was the primary focus for the military, with very little differentiation between civil and military actions. "Identifiable structural or career boundaries separating *paramilitary police* corps and the three service branches, especially the Army, were nonexistent."²⁵ Many times the military was used to quell public unrest and frequently occupied geographical areas for internal security. The most often cited example of military/civilian crossover of functions is the case of five terrorists being convicted of murder of a policeman in a military court even though they had no connection with the military.

The younger personnel of Franco's army were educated to believe that the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s was a manifestation of democracy. If not for the failed attempt at democracy, Spain would never have endured the horrors of that war.

²⁴ Harry E. Bergold, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) in a statement Senate Foreign Relations Committee, regarding the Treaty Between the United States and Spain, March 12, 1976. Found in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Ninety-fourth Congress Second Session on H.R. 14940 Role of Spain in U.S. Defense Planning Provisions of the Treaty and Implementing Legislation. June 8&16, 1976 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 8.

²⁵ Rafael Bañón-Martínez, "Spanish Military Reform and Modernization" ed Kenneth Maxwell in *Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 240.

In the early to mid 1970s Spain's military force consisted of an army of over 240,000 personnel, the vast majority of which (approximately 190,000) were conscripts, and a navy of approximately 57,000 men (43,000 conscripts) with an additional 12,000 marines and the most professional of the forces, the Air Force with 38,000 men.²⁶ The number of officers was equal to the number of noncommissioned officers with far too many generals still serving beyond retirement age.²⁷ This top-heavy system resulted in more than half of the budget having to be spent on personnel instead of equipment and training.

Even after the death of Franco, the military still believed it was charged with the internal domestic care of Spain. The transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy was very difficult for most to grasp. The nationwide acceptance of certain political parties (the Communist Party, officially recognized in 1977, was the antithesis of everything the military had endorsed until that time) led the military to a state of dissatisfaction. This feeling was compounded by increases in terrorist activity that appeared focused against the military. The government attempted to improve the situation by promoting officers that supported the new democracy and increasing the military budget but these solutions did not correct the problem. It appeared, at least to the military, that the new government was losing control. This led certain factions of the military to believe it was time for them to step in and take charge.

²⁶ *The Military Balance: 1972-1973*", The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 44.

²⁷ Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain, the United States, and NATO: Strategic Facts and Political Realities" in *Spain's Entry Into NATO* eds, Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 129.

Discontent came to a head when, at 6:25 P.M. on February 23, 1981, Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero and his supporters in the Guardia Civil Seized the Cortes building during parliamentary proceedings on the confirmation of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as prime minister, holding the government and the parliament hostage. Concurrently, Lt. Gen. Milans del Bosch, military commander in Valencia, declared martial law and brought his troops into the streets to take control of the city.²⁸

The King, acting in his position as Commander in Chief took command of the situation and insisted upon the loyalty of the army. His key commanders responded accordingly and the golpe or coup attempt ended without violence. This event probably did more for the popularity of the King and democracy than any intentional action or attempt to win the hearts of the public. It also served as proof that civilian control of the military was not only possible in Spain; moreover it was the best method for the new democracy.

2. Modernization

The move toward NATO, which came soon after the golpe, was by necessity, a move toward modernization of the military. Although the transition to democracy had initiated the need for improvements and advances in military technology, possible NATO involvement encouraged the military to examine the capabilities of other military forces. It also allowed the army the opportunity to view itself as a force that needed to look outward to national defense instead of as a police force for local security and control of the behavior of citizens of Spain for Franco.

In 1982, when the Socialist Party came into power one of their first moves was to institute military reform. In the early years of democracy, by means of legal decree, the military had already been formally subordinated to civilian control and ordered to cease

²⁸ Maxwell and Spiegel, p. 17.

its political involvement. The army was the service that had been the most closely involved in the political process and as such seemed the most disgruntled about relinquishing power. In order to avert the difficulties encountered between the previous government and the military, the PSOE ensured discussions about continued reform included military input. In 1984, a defense law was passed that eliminated the old system of having the military regulate itself and moved control firmly into civilian hands. The new Ministry of Defense now had the power to initiate defense policy. The reduction of the military was of primary importance. Even though the cutbacks in military personnel were not as deep as originally planned they were significant enough to effect a positive change. This reworking of the defense budget now allowed them to shift money from personnel expenses to new equipment and training.

Additionally, the government was laying out a plan of action for the newly reforming military. Certain functions were laid out specifying the current military mission.

- Defend the constitutional order
- Guarantee the territorial integrity of Spain
- Protect the population from aggression or natural disaster
- Commit to the defense and security of the western world
- Establish effective control over the Straits of Gibraltar²⁹

²⁹ Ibid, p. 31.

As stated before, these objectives encouraged a move away from the inward looking policies of the past and outward to the rest of the world. They also (intentionally) tied in very nicely to the aims of NATO.

C. NEW ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE MILITARY

For more than two years after the approval by the Spanish population to remain in NATO, meetings and discussions concerning Spanish military obligations in the Alliance were held between the Defense Planning Committee of NATO and Spain's ministers of foreign affairs and defense. The culmination of these talks is the agreement known as the "Spanish Model" of NATO integration. The major points are that Spain will participate only in the following areas:

1. The defense of Spanish territory.
2. Air control and air defense in the Spanish area of responsibility including cooperation with adjacent areas.
3. The establishment of a new NATO naval force under Spanish command to patrol sea-lanes around the Straits of Gibraltar.
4. Naval and Air operations in the Eastern Atlantic.
5. Naval and Air operations in the Western Mediterranean.
6. The use of Spanish territory as a transit, support and rear logistic area.³⁰

These efforts allowed Spain to contribute to the Organization without participating in the integrated military command structure. However, over the next few years, while still under the Socialist Party leadership, Spain expanded its participation in the NATO Headquarters to include the Defence Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the International Staff, Defense Planning panels, Forces Assignment Committee and the Military Committee. This participation may be seen by some as only

³⁰ Ibid, p. 30.

conducting the business of NATO, however others might say this participation goes against the voters' wishes when they made their decision in the referendum in 1986. In any case, over the next few years, Spain worked with NATO to develop the most complete association possible without infringing on the restrictions imposed by the referendum.

Spain's position from the end of World War II to 1988 went from one of non-democratic isolation and shunning by the rest of Europe to a liberal democracy with an active membership in European security. From this point in time, Spain moved into the mainstream of Europe as a member of the most important economic and political organizations, NATO and the European Community.

III. SPAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

*Although Spain's policy towards NATO in the past has produced serious disagreements ... there is now a broad consensus about NATO and NATO enlargement across the political spectrum.*³¹

Fernando Rodrigo

Today, Spain is firmly ensconced in all aspects of NATO. No longer sitting on the outside of the military command structure, Spain is preparing to take command of the Joint Sub-Regional Command SouthWest located in Madrid. In January of 1998, official word was sent to NATO signifying Spain's decision to join the integrated military command structure.

The *Study on NATO Enlargement*, dated September 1995 states that no longer would there be 'special' relationships such as the 'Spanish Model' for different members joining the Organization.³² From this point on "new members will be full members of the Alliance, enjoying all the rights and assuming all the obligations under the Washington Treaty. This decision will affect all countries desiring membership that were not already a member of the Alliance, such as Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (and any others that may be considered in the future).

More than a decade had passed since the NATO referendum in Spain when in November of 1996, the Spanish parliament made the decision that it was time for changes in the relationship between the Alliance and Spain. March of 1996 saw the Partido

³¹ Fernando Rodrigo, *Spain and NATO's Enlargement* found on the internet at <http://www.nato.int/acad/conf/enlarg97/rodrigo.htm>

³² NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels September 1995) p. 29.

Popular with Jose Maria Aznar as party leader, win the majority of the parliament (but only by a small margin, the PP received 38.85 percent and 156 seats in Parliament, the PSOE still had 141 seats). With this party came the decision of the parliament to fully merge Spain into the integrated military command structure of NATO. This effort should not have been a difficult undertaking because according to Javier Rupérez , spokesman on foreign matters for the Partido Popular in December of 1995, Spain was already 95 percent integrated in the military command structure even though the Socialist Party denied this fact.³³ An additional positive factor for the future of Spain in NATO is the approval of almost the entire parliament, including the PSOE, only the communist party was opposed. The final vote, in November 1996 showed the overwhelming approval of the parliament with 293 votes in favor of full integration and 23 votes against.³⁴ No matter how minor the actual changes, nonetheless, along with this resolution came certain conditions or priorities that the parliament felt should be negotiated with NATO.

1. A smaller and more flexible NATO military chain of command.
2. Spain should receive command responsibilities commensurate with its military contribution and political power, especially in its areas of strategic interest.
3. The chain of command should reflect European identity.
4. NATO should support the integration of Central and Eastern European

³³ José Carlos Duque. "Medida logica para el PP y 'engaño' para IU" *CRONICA Diario* ,3 Diciembre 1995, p. 3.

³⁴ Rodrigo, p. 3.

countries (This was prior to the Madrid Summit where NATO invited Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join).

5. Spain felt compelled to support continuing negotiations between NATO and Russia.³⁵

One of the primary points of dissent was the NATO fourth level command area known as GIBMED. Since Spain does not acknowledge Gibraltar as a possession of Great Britain, it could not recognize the United Kingdom as being in charge of the NATO command based in Gibraltar. As such, this command was an obstacle that discouraged Spain's entry into the integrated command structure. This command will disappear in the restructuring of the NATO military command structure.

A second contentious point was the fact that the Canary Islands fell under the NATO command SACLANT that was based in the United States with the Major Subordinate Command – Iberlant – located in Portugal. This continued to put Spain's territory, the Canary Islands, as far as NATO's integrated defense planning is concerned, under a NATO command where Spain was not represented or could directly influence. Spain felt that their land should be under their authority, not that of another country.

These problems were partially solved with the new integrated military command structure. All fourth level commands, such as GIBMED, are being dissolved. Until recently, ongoing negotiations between Spain and Britain about Gibraltar were easing tensions between the two nations. Still, Spain refuses to recognize Britain's dominance

³⁵ Carlos Segovia. "La OTAN pretende atribuir directamente al mando de Nápoles la defensa de Canarias" *El Mundo*. 5 Noviembre 1997, p. 6.

of the area and frequent disagreements flare up and cause new arguments about Gibraltar and the surrounding area.

The latest disagreement involves the dispute about fishing rights and border crossings. When Spanish fishermen were illegally fishing in the waters off Gibraltar, their boat was seized by Gibraltar police. In turn Spain tightened the controls for crossing the border from Gibraltar into Spain and refused to recognize the driver's licenses issued by Gibraltar. Nevertheless, on many issues the two countries have been able to reach a compromise and once again talks are being conducted to resolve this latest disagreement.

Spain will also be satisfied with the fact that the Canary Islands no longer will be within the area of responsibility of the SACLANT's regional command located in Portugal. The Islands are now the responsibility of the subregional command in Madrid but are contained in a "bubble" (NATO term) of defense. The Islands will fall under the same command as mainland Spain. However, the security of the waters surrounding the Islands will be relegated to guardianship of the Regional Commander SouthEast, in Oeiras, Portugal. This was a concession that Spain did not want, but agreed to as part of the negotiating process for the new integrated military command structure.

The 15th of January in 1998, Spain finally communicated to NATO their desire to become fully integrated into the new integrated military command structure. This integration would require Spain to accept more responsibilities and be prepared to participate in new missions including those such as the NATO mission against the regime of Slobodan Milosevich in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. However, as shown in the

next section, Spain has already shown their inclination to work with NATO in out of area missions and operations.

A. MISSIONS

1. The Gulf War

Even before Spain's integration into the military command structure, the country was demonstrating its willingness to assist in missions outside its own borders (a change from the original agreement, solidified after the 1986 referendum) as evidenced by their participation in the Gulf War. Even though Spain did not send ground troops to join the coalition forces, the country participated in other ways. The United States was allowed to stage B-52 bombers from Moron de la Frontera, a military base located approximately 250 miles southwest of Madrid. These bombers left Moron for targets in Iraq, escorted by Spanish fighter planes. Additionally, the Spanish Air Force transported necessary equipment and weaponry for the U.S. forces from Torrejon, the military base outside of Madrid, to the air base in Moron and provided fuel for these missions. One news report revealed that as much as eighty percent of all the military supplies used by the United States during the Gulf War, passed through Spain.³⁶ This logistical support was augmented by intelligence information that Spain provided about Iraqi attacks on Israel.³⁷ The country also sent three warships into the Gulf region to support the United Nations embargo against Iraq.

³⁶ Tom Burns, "The Gulf War; Spain Coy on Secret Role for B-52 Bombers" *The Financial Times Limited* (London: February 2, 1991) Section I p. 2.

³⁷ Ibid.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Spain's most prominent mission within NATO so far is the participation in Bosnia. The Spanish Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Guardia Civil have been active participants in this mission. The mission in Bosnia is one of the new tasks, known as peacekeeping, that NATO has adopted after many years of being strictly a collective defense organization.

The mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was originally that of the United Nations (UN). As such, a force of more than 400,000 military coming from thirty-five different countries participated under the auspices of the UN for more than three years from 1992 to 1995. In August of 1992, Spain joined in the effort sending more than 900 troops. Even though Spain still has conscription, these soldiers were all volunteers, as required by Spanish law. During that three-year period, from October of 1992 until December of 1995, more than 8300 Spanish Army personnel participated in numerous activities of humanitarian aid.³⁸ Spain's Navy and Air Force also participated in the Bosnia mission under Operation "Sharp Guard" and Operation "Deny Flight." Operation Sharp Guard was a naval operation designed to prevent unauthorized shipping. Spain provided two frigates for this mission, one under the mandate of the Western European Union and one under NATO.

Operation Deny Flight was an air operation intended to avert flights over the designated 'no fly zone' over Bosnia to prevent bombing missions by the belligerent forces, to provide close air support to UN ground troops, and to conduct air strikes when

³⁸ The numbers for Spanish military participation in all peace missions since 1988 can be found on the internet at the Spanish Ministry of Defense web page: "Participación Española en Operaciones de Paz" *Misiones de Paz* Ministerio De Defensa <http://www.mde.es/mde/misiones1.htm>, p. 6.

necessary on command of the UN.³⁹ Spain's participation in the Operation Deny Flight mission was a close air support aircraft (CASA 212), eight fighter aircraft (EF-18), and two air-to-air refueling aircraft (KC130).⁴⁰

In December 1995 the authority to conduct operations was transferred from the United Nations to NATO. This action came about after the signing of the Dayton Accord (Dayton, Ohio USA November 1995) and the Bosnian Peace Agreement (Paris, France December 1995) in order to ensure the implementation of the terms of the agreement. Under the NATO implementation force (IFOR) known as Operation Joint Endeavor, more than 60,000 troops served of which more than 1000 personnel were Spanish.

This mission was successfully concluded on the 20th of December 1996, one year after it began. However, NATO's job was not done and this date also marks the start date of the stabilization force (SFOR) known as Operation Joint Guard, a mission designed to assist in the consolidation of peace in the Bosnia-Herzegovina region. Spanish military participation in this NATO mission was similar to their IFOR participation. The army provided a brigade consisting of approximately 1200 soldiers, 2 recon patrols, a helicopter detachment, and numerous headquarters and logistical personnel. Naval participation consisted of a frigate that provides periodical naval support in the Adriatic Sea. Air support includes F-18s, C-130s and T-12s with all the corresponding support

³⁹ Ibid, p. 7.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

personnel and equipment located in the area. Outside the country, the Air Force also has planes on 48 hour and 96 hour alert, in case the need for additional support should arise.⁴¹

B. STAFF REQUIREMENTS

The staff requirements for Spain in NATO will soon increase tremendously due to their upcoming entry into the integrated military command structure and the projected establishment of the new Joint Sub-Regional Command SouthWest that will be commanded by Spain.

1. Senior Positions

The new military command structure will offer Spain thirteen general officer billets, which equals a total of 19 'stars'. This dispersal of positions by the number of stars seems to be a matter of pride, the more stars you have in key positions the greater your stature in the Organization. Nineteen stars places Spain in fifth place behind Italy but ahead of Turkey in standing in the Alliance. Seven of these positions are permanent and six will rotate between different countries.⁴²

2. Further Staff Obligations

Additional staffing will be needed for the new Headquarters of the Joint Sub-Regional Command SouthWest. Currently NATO is working on the division of labor among its members, but Spain knows that they will staff at least one hundred positions in the Madrid Headquarters with fifty of these being Spanish officers. Approximately four

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 8.

⁴² Miguel González, "España Tendrá Siete Generales Fijos y Seis Rotativos en la Nueva Estructura Militar de la OTAN" *El País*. 15 Diciembre 1998, p. 21.

hundred Spanish military of all ranks and branches will occupy military structural positions within headquarters and offices NATO wide.⁴³

C. FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

According to reports from *ABC*, a Spanish newspaper, before joining the integrated military command structure, Spain spent approximately two billion pesetas (approximately \$16 million in United States dollars) annually on NATO support. This figure included everything from personnel (both military and civilian) to equipment to infrastructure requirements. With the new command structure, Spanish integration and Spain's desire to participate fully, this amount will increase tremendously. The projections that the government reviewed while deciding on the issue of the integrated military command structure predicted that the budget of 750 million pesetas for military expenditures would increase to 3.5 billion (approx. \$28 million US) and personnel costs would increase from 80 million pesetas to 600 million (of this figure, 450 million would be used for the new NATO Command Headquarters in Madrid).⁴⁴

Only in a historical sense is there still a "Spanish model" of NATO participation. No longer does Spain stand out in NATO membership as being different or having 'special' agreements.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Alberto Sotillo, "La integración de España en la estructura militar de la OTAN costará 5.500 millones" *ABC* (Spain) Domingo 10 Noviembre 96.

IV. THE THREE NEW MEMBERS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM SPAIN

When Franco died, we were gravely preoccupied with what was going to happen. In the beginning, the transition was very difficult--and so it is a miracle that Spain has such a mature democracy today.⁴⁵

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo

A. THE NEW MEMBERS

In the mid summer days of 1997, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were recognized as the official winners in the NATO lottery. After scrambling to prepare themselves to be worthy of consideration, these three now had to continue down the path to complete NATO preparedness. With this move, the lines between democratic Western Europe and the rest of the continent were blurring. No longer would there be the “Us-Them” mentality with the commensurate suspicions. The prospective members had just over a year to completely shake off their association with the former Soviet Union and solidify their connection to the liberal democracies associated with NATO.

In order to understand the parallels between the three new members of NATO today and that of Spain in 1982 during its integration process, it is necessary to understand the historic transformations that have occurred in Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland on their way to NATO membership.

⁴⁵ Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, speaking during an interview with Georgie Anne Geyer in September, 1998. On the internet at <http://www.uexpress.com/ups/opinion/column/gg/text/1998/09/gg980918.html>, Universal Press Syndicate.

1. Czech Republic

The offer of NATO membership is, for us, not only a chance to fulfil our security needs but, above all, a chance to share and play a part in the peaceful and democratic development of this continent and the whole world, together with our European and American partners. With the opening of its doors, the Alliance is embarking on a new chapter in its history. ⁴⁶

Václav Havel
President of the Czech Republic

On 12 March of 1999, Czech Republic formally joined NATO in a ceremony in Independence, Missouri. This marked the beginning of a new era in NATO history.

In 1993, the Czech Republic agreeably split from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (known as Czechoslovakia) to form its own nation. This came after 75 years of unity with the Slovak Republic known today as Slovakia. As Czechoslovakia, the country was a parliamentary democracy from 1918 until 1938.

As a result of the 1938 Munich Pact peace talks Czechoslovakia was compelled to turn over some of its territory to Hitler. This seeming lack of concern for Czechoslovakia by France and the United Kingdom convinced Hitler of his right to feel free to invade the rest of the country in March of 1939. Near the end of the war, 'friendly' Soviet troops liberated the country from German control. For the next three years, from 1945 to 1948, the Communist Party increasingly won key government positions. Then in the summer of 1948, the Communist Party took complete control of the government through a Soviet backed coup d'état and began the transition to a Soviet model of government. The move away from privatized businesses and toward collectivization, industrialization, and

⁴⁶ Václav Havel, "NATO and the Czech Republic: A Common Destiny," *NATO Review*, September-October 1997, p. 8.

nationalization began and commerce and dealings with Western Europe were limited. On the positive side, attempts were made to improve the lives of the workers that were traditionally from the lower end of the scale.

In the late 1960's some restrictive aspects of the government, such as censorship, were relaxed and reforms were introduced. Unfortunately, the citizens enjoyed these new freedoms too much and demanded more. The Soviet government felt threatened and responded in 1968 by sending troops into Czechoslovakia to quell the protests and end the experiments in a more flexible form of government. For the next twenty years, with Soviet troops at their disposal, the Communist Party maintained their complete control of Czechoslovakia by whatever means necessary.

Velvet Revolution

November of 1989 marks the end of an era in Czechoslovakia. On the 17th, International Students Day, a memorial service was held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the death of a student (Jan Palach) at the hands of Nazi troops. Unlike in years past, this time the service was supplemented by an anti-regime demonstration organized by various student groups. The crowd of people grew to the point the Communist Party leaders became worried and called in the police. The police were able to quell the demonstration with violence. Numerous student protesters had to be taken to the hospital after being beaten by the police.⁴⁷ The citizens denounced this behavior by the police and took to the streets in protest. Strikes were initiated and went on for more

⁴⁷ John Tagliabue, "Police Force Used A 3rd Day in Prague" *New York Times*, 20 November 1989, Front page.

than a week and the citizenry refused to be appeased by Communist Party attempts to correct the situation. The people decided that they wanted free elections and the end of the single party rule and would work to gain these changes. It took three weeks but the Communist Party members resigned and by December (1989) the country was again holding democratic elections, choosing Václav Havel as the next president.⁴⁸ This revolution is today known as the Velvet Revolution because it was peaceful and 'without' violence, however those beaten by the police would probably disagree with this terminology. It was much less violent than many government overthrows that have taken place in this century.

After the revolution, the Czech and Slovak leaders could not agree on the future of Czechoslovakia as a united country. Political and economic factors were the major points of contention and by 1993 Czechoslovakia no longer existed. The Czech Republic could now move toward a free market economy.

January 1st 1993 marks the day that the Czech Republic came into existence as an independent country. The Czech government is a parliamentary democracy with a President and a Prime Minister, a bicameral Parliament with a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Today, while there are many political parties in Czech Republic only six hold seats in the Parliament. These range from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) that in the 1996 Senate election received 32 of 81 seats and in the 1996 Chamber of Deputies

⁴⁸Sharon L. Wolchik "Czechoslovakia" in *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* ed. Seymour Martin Lipset , Vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), p. 330.

election received 68 of 200 seats to the Democratic Union (DEU) that secured 1 Senate seat in the 1996 election.⁴⁹

As of 1996, the Czech economy was considered one of the most stable and prosperous of Eastern and Central Europe. According to the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook the Czech Republic had "achievements of strong GDP growth, a balanced budget, and inflation and unemployment that were among the lowest in the region."⁵⁰ Unfortunately, 1997 was financially a more difficult year and stringent measures had to be imposed by the government to get the economy back on track. These procedures should be effective and return the Czech Republic to a more prosperous economic path.

2. Hungary

*In seeking to join NATO, Hungary is not motivated by the fear of a military threat. Our determination to become a member of the Alliance is based on shared values and the desire to contribute to a favourable security environment. In our opinion, NATO enlargement represents the eastward expansion of the region of security and stability in Europe.*⁵¹

László Kovács
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary

At the end of World War I, Hungary was on the losing end of the fight. In 1867, a compromise between Austria and Hungary formed the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary ruled by a Habsburg emperor. This ruler of the Austro-Hungarian Empire

⁴⁹ Election numbers and party names and abbreviations were found in the online Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook in the section on the Czech Republic at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ex.html>

⁵⁰ Ibid. 6 (Economy Overview).

⁵¹ László Kovács, "Hungary's Contribution to European Security," *NATO Review*, September-October 1997, p. 9.

presented ultimatums to Serbia that eventually resulted in World War I. Even though in 1918 Hungary declared itself a separate nation, negotiated a separate peace, and in November of that year the ruler of the empire surrendered his power (over Hungary). The victors still considered Hungary part of the Dual Monarchy that initiated the war.⁵² When the time came to divide up the spoils of war, Hungary lost a significant amount of its territory and many of its people.

In the early 1930s, Hungary became a nation under the rule of a right wing dictator, who developed strong ties with Germany. Successive governments were also very right wing. Then, during the Second World War, Hungary started the war on the side of Germany after Hitler promised land in exchange for assistance. Admiral Horthy, the Regent of Hungary, agreed to this arrangement and sent troops to occupy Yugoslavian land that German forces had invaded. Admiral Horthy quickly became Hitler's pawn in the war. Later in the war, Hungary became disillusioned with the Nazi regime and attempted unsuccessfully to switch to the side of the allies in 1944. This attempt resulted in the country being overrun and occupied by German forces. The end of the war brought more bad news for the country, although it did not seem so at the time. The Allies said that there would be free elections in Hungary but left the conduct of these elections to the Allied Control Commission, which was Soviet controlled. Even though the Communist Party lost the election of 1945, they soon became part of the winning team when the Independent Smallholders' Party (with 57 percent of the vote) was forced into a coalition

⁵² Charles Sudetic, "Historical Setting" in *Hungary, A Country Study*, ed. Stephen R. Burant, 2nd edition, Country Studies-Area Handbook Series, DA Pam 55-165 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990), pp. 33-38.

with the Communist Party. In the typical fashion of the Communist Party, they soon had control of the entire government.⁵³

The year 1956 was significant in the history of Hungary as the time when the people tried to throw off the shackles of Communism by taking to the streets in protest. The demonstration was started by students who were demanding reform and democracy. The police responded violently, which led to further uprisings across the country in support of the student movement. The Soviets deployed troops to the areas of discontent but then backed off for several days. When the Soviet forces returned, they destroyed the resistance movement by eliminating the troublemakers and making life miserable for the rest of the country.⁵⁴

In the 1960s, economic reforms were put in place to improve Hungary's economic standings in the world. These reforms however, were unsuccessful and the result was further discontent. There were also political reforms, with the Electoral Law of 1966, which were as fruitful as the economic reforms.

In 1989, round table negotiations between the Communist Hungarian Socialists Worker's Party (HSWP) and eight of the opposition parties established the basis for a multi-party system of government elections.⁵⁵ This action led the way to free elections in 1990 with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) winning the majority of the seats. These two parties then formed a coalition and

⁵³ Andrew C. Janos, "Hungary," in *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* ed. Seymour Martin Lipset, Vol. 3 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), p. 580.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 581.

⁵⁵ Jeffery Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press 1996), p. 138.

served as Hungary's first non-Communist government in more than forty years. In 1994, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) returned to the scene to win the majority of the parliament. This was the party that previously had been the Communist Party but in 1989 reworked itself to be more acceptable to the new democratic regime.

Between 1989 and 1997, nearly 200 political parties registered as legal organizations in Hungary. However according to the *Freedom in the World* survey most of them "are small or inactive."⁵⁶ In June of 1998, a coalition government led by Viktor Orban of the Hungarian Civic Party or FiDeSz (which won 146 of 386 seats in the Parliament) was formed, which includes the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Smallholders' Party (FKGP).⁵⁷ The government is a parliamentary democracy that consists of an executive branch with a President and a Prime Minister, a legislative branch, which unlike the other two countries (Czech Republic and Poland) is unicameral with 386 seats through proportional and direct representation, and a judicial branch with a Constitutional Court. Hungary also developed a new post communist regime constitution. A revision was made to the 1949 constitution in 1989 and it was amended in 1997.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Freedom In The World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1996-1997*, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 275.

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of Commerce 1999 Country Commercial Guide: Hungary, Chapter 3 "Political Environment". This document is available online at <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/eebic/countryr/hungary/huccg99.htm>

⁵⁸ Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook in the section on the Hungary online at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ex.html>

Hungary's economic outlook continues to improve according to the U.S. Department of Commerce's 1999 Country Commercial Guide.⁵⁹ Foreign investment has continued to increase while unemployment continued to decline. Perhaps most significant is the privatization of formerly public holdings. "Since 1989, the private sector in Hungary has grown from approximately 20 percent to over 80 percent of GDP. ... the state has liquidated or privatized 80 percent of its holdings and aims to complete its privatization program by the end of 1998."⁶⁰ It is expected that Hungary will continue to thrive economically.

3. Poland

*In becoming a member of the Atlantic community, Poland is determined to uphold the Alliance's effectiveness. A stable country with a dynamic and growing economy, Poland is a land free of conflicts with its neighbours. It has completed its democratic transformation, contributes actively and constructively to peaceful international relations and will in future be a member of the European Union. And, no less significantly, Poland possesses a substantial military potential.*⁶¹

Aleksander Kwásniewski

This last country to be discussed was the first one to break away from the Soviet Union. Poland led the way toward freedom and independence for many of the Central and Eastern European countries.

⁵⁹ U.S. Department of Commerce. Chapter 2 Economic Trends. 6 This guide is developed by a team (through the American Embassies in each of the respective countries) to assist businesses from the United States when contemplating trade and commerce in certain countries.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 7.

⁶¹ Aleksander Kwásniewski, "Poland in NATO—Opportunities and Challenges," *NATO Review*, September-October 1997, p. 7.

In September of 1939, Germany began World War II by attacking Poland; after the defeat of Poland, under a secret amendment to the Friendship Act between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, Poland was divided and both countries laid claim. Western Poland became a government district of Germany and Eastern Poland became part of the Soviet Union. Two years later, Germany invaded the Soviet Union and occupied all of Poland. After the defeat of Germany and the end of the war, Germany was ousted from Poland. However the eastern part of Poland, which became part of the Soviet Union under the aforementioned agreement, remained under the Soviet Union's governance. In return, Poland received compensation from former German territory on its western borders. After the conclusion of the war Poland organized a Provisional Government of National Unity. The country intended to hold free elections. However, this government was Soviet imposed and soon allowed the Polish Communist Party to "gain control of key levers of power and unleash political repression that soon destroyed all resistance."⁶² By 1948 there was no legal opposition to the Communist Party in Poland.

The Polish model of communism was significantly different from the rest of Soviet dependent communism. Land remained predominantly in the hands of private citizens and numerous businesses remained privatized. The Polish Catholic Church remained very influential in the country even in the face of communism.⁶³

⁶² Grzegorz Ekiert "Poland" in *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* ed. Seymour Martin Lipset, Vol. 3 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), p. 949.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 950.

Although there were many uprisings and demonstrations of discontent through the years, the worst was probably the rebellion by workers against the raising of consumer goods prices in 1970. Before this protest was over, more than 45 people were dead and 1200 were wounded. Each protest and strike by the workers became more and more organized, and by the early 1980s, the workers formed an independent trade union known as 'Solidarity'. Through negotiations, this trade union became legal under the Polish Communist regime. With the Solidarity movement, the civil society changed. The people wanted more freedom to participate in political activities.⁶⁴ Fear of this new organization led the Soviet Union in 1981 to pressure the Polish government into declaring martial law. "Polish troops entered the cities, Solidarity activists were arrested, all independent organizations were banned, and the country's borders were sealed."⁶⁵ Political opposition continued for the rest of the decade and it took until April of 1989 for the government and the Solidarity movement to come to a peaceful agreement. Solidarity was now the leading organization of the country.

In August of 1989, the Communist Party (Polish United Workers Party) was defeated as the majority party and a Solidarity-backed, non-communist (Tadeusz Mazowiecki) was elected as Prime Minister for the first time in forty years. By December of the same year, the Lower House of the Parliament, or Sejm had voted to transform the Polish economic system from one that was centrally planned to a free market system. The next year, 1990, free elections were held at the local level and again the Communist

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 951.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Party candidates (now called the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) lost to the Solidarity candidates. In November of 1990, Poland elected a new President, Lech Walesa, the symbol of the Solidarity Movement, to a five-year term.

The early 1990s were difficult economically for Poland. The economic reforms were so severe that the workers took to the streets in protest. "Industrial output fell by 24 percent in 1990, unemployment rose from zero to 15.3 percent by 1993, new social inequalities emerged, and a less comprehensive system of welfare provisions was instituted."⁶⁶ Fortunately, the severe reforms were effective and today Poland is considered economically sound as evidenced by its ability to attract foreign investment. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, *Country Commercial Guide: Poland*, "Poland has become the leader in Central Europe in attracting foreign investors, with Hungary falling to the second position and the Czech Republic maintaining its third place."⁶⁷

In 1997, the populace voted, by national referendum, on a new constitution. It was approved and stands today as the basis for the government that is a parliamentary democracy. It consists of an executive branch with a President and Prime Minister, a legislative branch with a bicameral National Assembly with a 460 seat lower house (Sejm) and a 100 seat upper house (Senate) and a judicial branch with a Supreme Court and a Constitutional Tribunal. Political parties are numerous and frequently form coalitions to strengthen their positions. The Solidarity Electoral Action (ASW) and the

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 952.

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of Commerce 1999 Country Commercial Guide: Poland, Chapter 3 "Political Environment". Available online at <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/eebic/countryr/poland/polccg99.htm>

Freedom Union (UW) were the two parties to win the majority of seats (261 of 460 between the two) in the 1997 election. These two parties then formed a coalition government that barring, any unforeseen problems will remain in power until the year 2001.⁶⁸

Summary

Although the transformation in Czech Republic was the 'velvet revolution' in Hungary it was round table negotiations, and in Poland it was evolutionary stages, all three evolved much more quietly than anyone ever imagined during the Cold War. The late 1990s have seen these three establish democratic governments, solid constitutions and defense reforms.

B. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC INFLUENCE

In some ways the world situation has not changed significantly in the years since Spain became the sixteenth NATO member. NATO enlargement is being protested by Russia today in much the same way it was protested in 1982 by the Soviet Union. At that time, the Soviet Union believed that expanding NATO would have an effect on the Warsaw Pact countries and today, Russia believes that the addition of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will impact their place in the world. When Spain was following the procedures necessary to join NATO, "(t)he Soviet Union tried to slow the process through direct pressure on Spain, through pressure on Alliance members, and through interference

⁶⁸ The AWS is itself a coalition and won 201 of the seats, while the UW won 60. Election results found online in the U.S. Department of Commerce 1999 Country Commercial Guide: Poland, Chapter 3 "Political Environment". Available online at <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/eebic/countryr/poland/polccg99.htm>

in Spanish politics, but failed."⁶⁹ These are the same methods used recently by Russia to encourage Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to remain separate from NATO.

The goal of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s was not necessarily to draw Spain into a defense alliance but to keep Spain out of NATO. In order to accomplish this goal, the Soviet Union attempted to convince Spain of the financial advantages of developing stronger ties between the two through expanded trade negotiations and increased trade agreements. These efforts resulted in increased trade over what it had been between the Soviet Union and Spain but certainly not near enough to convince Spain that it was more advantageous to turn to Eastern Europe than to NATO. The percentages were still far below Spain's imports and exports with the United States and the European Economic Community members. "Trade with the United States accounted for 7.0 percent of Spanish exports and 12.4 percent of imports in 1979. Trade with European Economic Community nations accounted for a whopping 48 percent of exports and 32 percent of imports."⁷⁰ This compares quite feebly with the two or three percent of import-export trade with Eastern Europe and the USSR. If economic prosperity was the goal, Spain was certainly not going to find it dealing with the Soviet Union in place of Western Europe and the United States.

The Soviet propaganda machine was in full force when they released articles (in journals targeted for foreign audience consumption) such as those directed at Spain to

⁶⁹ Edward McKim Sniffin, *The International Politics of Spanish Accession to NATO* (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, March 1982), p. 132.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 26.

inspire a change of heart about NATO integration. An example of this type of verbal coercion comes from the Soviet publication *International Affairs*

The membership of Spain in NATO will rather weaken the national security of the country and limit its sovereignty. It would involve it in the confrontation with the Warsaw Treaty countries on the side of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc, in its stepped up military preparations with all the obtaining adverse economic and social consequences for country.⁷¹

While these comments may have had an effect on the population in general, it did not change the focus of the government, which continued to work toward NATO membership.

Another way that the Soviet Union tried to stop NATO enlargement was through the NATO requirement for a unanimous vote in decision-making. Even if the USSR could not convince Spain not to join NATO, perhaps it could coerce one of the fifteen NATO members to vote against Spain's integration. Soviet statements were released and rumors abounded about how the USSR would be forced to react if NATO added Spain to their membership. The most popular threat included the expansion of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in retaliation for NATO enlargement.⁷² Obviously Russia did not play this card (or did not play it successfully) or Spain would not be a member today.

Unwilling to give up, in 1986 when Spain was preparing for the referendum on NATO membership, the Soviet Union again stepped up its campaign to convince Spain to leave NATO. Actually the criticism of the membership never stopped, as evidenced by

⁷¹ Y. Zakharov, "Spain in the Year 1981," *International Affairs*, No. 9, 1981, p. 120 as quoted in Susan Clark, "Soviet Perspectives on Spanish Security Policy," ed. Kenneth Maxwell in *Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press 1991), p. 128.

⁷² Sniffin, p. 31.

another *International Affairs* article from 1983 (although since the PSOE had promised a referendum concerning NATO involvement, the expectation that it would occur soon would cause the author to feel the need to stress his point whenever possible).

Spain's NATO membership is incapable of strengthening its national security, for it will be inevitably involved in the arms race whipped up by NATO with all the ensuing unfavorable political, economic and social consequences. This step is fraught with dire consequences not only for Spain but for Europe in general and for the entire international situation. By upsetting the military-strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, this step is liable to destabilize the situation in Europe, increase international tensions and promote the threat of war—all of which is in the interests of the Pentagon and NATO strategists.⁷³

Unlike the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Spain was never dominated by the USSR and so did not consider it a threat to their security. Because of this, it cannot be said that Spain needed to join NATO in order to feel secure from a Soviet threat.

Russia is once again protesting NATO enlargement as a threat. If NATO continues to approach and encroach on the Russian borders what else can the government believe except that NATO plans to take over Russia? In numerous declarations NATO has attempted to soothe Russia's fears but for many years to no avail. As far back as July of 1990, the Heads of State and Government that participated in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in London have been issuing statements to this effect. The London Declaration issued from this meeting stated "The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or

⁷³ V. Krestyaninov, "Spain: A Sign of the Times," *International Affairs* No. 10, 1983, p.134 as quoted in Clark, p. 128.

political independence of any state or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. ... Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.”⁷⁴ Then in November of 1991, the NAC issued an invitation for these countries to join them in December in Brussels “to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership...”⁷⁵ Finally in May of 1997, the United States and Russia signed the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation.’ The Founding Act was designed to demonstrate to Russia that NATO had only the best interests of new members in mind with no desire to alarm anyone with a NATO enlargement.

Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this experience is that diplomacy and negotiations can overcome many of the disagreements between nations. While the Soviet Union was never overjoyed with Spain joining NATO, pragmatism prevailed and the situation was accepted. Similarly, Russia has acknowledged that Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are now NATO members even though it was not the ideal situation from Russia’s perspective.

⁷⁴ “London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance” *NATO Review*, No 4., August 1990, p. 32.

⁷⁵ “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation” (Press Communique) *NATO Review*, No. 6, December 1991, Documentation section.

C. DOMESTIC SITUATION

In the same way that Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have been working to solidify their democratic governments, so did Spain during the post-Franco years. Adaptations to democratic institutions were necessary to consolidate the democracy in a way that there would be no turning back. The quest was to so firmly entrench the democratic mindset that no one would even consider the possibility of returning to any other type of regime.

A lesson to be learned from Spain's integration into NATO concerns conducting a referendum for an issue such as NATO involvement. While visiting in Prague, Czech Republic, the Spanish Economic and Finance Minister Rodrigo Rato said that most Spanish political parties agree that this type of issue should be handled in the parliament rather than laying the issue out before the people of the country. The consequences from a national referendum are difficult to foresee.⁷⁶ Even though Spain held a national referendum in 1986 to decide on the NATO issue, in 1997 the parliament decided to make the decision in-house rather than dealing with the aftereffects of putting the question to the voter. This was because (even though the Communist Party disagreed) the parliament decided that this was a completely different issue than what Spain voted on in 1986.

⁷⁶ Spanish Economy and Finance Minister Rodrigo Rato speaking to reporters after he met with Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec 3 March 1997, in Prague FBIS Transcribed Text Document ID: FTS19970303000585 Entry Date: 03/03/1997, Version #01.

D. MILITARY SITUATION

Above all else, Spain is an excellent example of how a country is able to transition from a militarily dominated country to a nation with civilian control of the military. This now is one of the primary requirements for NATO acceptance. From the time the *Study on NATO Enlargement* was published in 1995 NATO decided that no country would be allowed to enter the Organization without having civilian control of its military.⁷⁷ Therefore this was a very important aspect of Spain's evolution for the three new members to understand.

In some aspects the military of Spain at the end of Franco's regime was very similar to the armed forces of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland when the Warsaw Pact dissolved. It was engulfed in an inordinate amount of outdated equipment and overburdened with too many high-ranking officers, which were tied too closely to the former regime. Many of these senior officers strongly related to the idea of a military dominated country and had a difficult time adapting to the concept of a democratic nation with military forces controlled by a civilian government with separation of powers. Because of this viewpoint, many of the senior officers had to be retired, but gradually, so that the military was not stripped of all its personnel with experience. The focus for the military had to shift away from internal political matters toward external threat and the connection with the old regime had to be broken.

In this same way, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland will have to reduce their senior military numbers and determine which of their officers are willing and able to

⁷⁷ Simon, p. 289.

adapt to the changes. Not only must they be willing to conform to the needs of each country as a democracy but also as a new member of NATO with all the requisite demands as was the case with Spain. They must be prepared to learn new languages and learn to use new equipment and ensure their equipment is compatible with the equipment of other NATO countries.

Many adaptations of the Spanish military have been made over the years to suit the changing needs of the country, especially within the context of NATO membership. While the three new members have already made tremendous strides in adapting their military forces to comply with NATO membership, they must remember that future changes to conform to NATO's adaptations to a changing world environment are not only possible but likely.

E. MORE LESSONS LEARNED

All three of these countries have come a long way from their days as members of the Warsaw Pact. Their move "to erect liberal democratic political institution, establish market economies, guarantee civil and human rights, and acquire civil control of the military"⁷⁸ as required for NATO membership is reminiscent of Spain in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These three countries have worked relentlessly to ensure all of these requirements were in place before March of 1999 when they were to sign the final accession papers.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 2.

Certain general lessons have been learned from Spain's successful democratization and integration into NATO. Of these, four stand out as being the most important for Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to emulate.

1. **The consolidation of the democratic institutions.** Spain exemplifies a very effective example of a consolidated democracy. The institutions that provide the citizens of a country the right to a freely elected government are firmly in place. At the time Spain joined NATO it was in approximately the same situation as the three new NATO members. Spain had not been a democracy for a significant length of time and was still attempting to internalize the idea of democracy in all its citizens. By joining an organization composed of liberal democracies, the concept of democracy was reinforced throughout the country. Seeing how successful Spain has been with this transition, with no recent tradition of democracy, should encourage Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in their move toward democratic consolidation and NATO membership.
2. **Economic restructuring.** Economic changes and reforms are necessary to transition to market economies which are considered essential to become a member of the Western Alliance. These reforms, which may seem harsh during the adaptation period, result in a system that allows the country to participate effectively in the world economy. In this respect, Spain can be viewed by the three new members as having suffered through the bad times, (just as they have had economic problems in recent years) but now enjoying

the prosperity of the free market system with the additional benefits of being considered a member in organizations such as the European Union. NATO membership does not qualify a country for European Union membership and vice versa. They are two completely different organizations with separate purposes and structures. NATO is devoted to collective defense and the European Union is dedicated primarily to economic and social matters with a further intention to build a European house of integrated nations. Both organizations recognize the need for interlocking institutions and the irresponsibility of unnecessarily duplicating the fulfillment of mission requirements. However, member countries of both organizations recognize and understand the requirements for the other which could allow a member of one organization to be viewed favorably by the other.

3. **General involvement in Western systems and a Western view of the world.** After many years of existence under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, a change has to be made by the citizens to view the world in a new way. After the end of Franco's dictatorship in Spain, the citizens had to learn about the rest of the world for themselves, not through the eyes of Franco and the ruling class. In this same way the citizens of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have to recover from fifty years of communist indoctrination and ideology.
4. **Civilian control of the armed forces.** Once again Spain serves as a model to demonstrate how to exercise civilian control of the military. In his book on

NATO enlargement, Jeffery Simon articulates certain conditions that are necessary to ensure this control is effective. The two most relevant of these conditions are discussed below.

- a. The first condition is that there must be “a clear division of authority between president and the government (prime minister and defense/interior minister) in Constitutions or through public law. The law should clearly establish who commands and controls the military and promotes military officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and who has authority to make the transition to war.”⁷⁹
- b. The second condition is “restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the armed forces to be effective.”⁸⁰

Spain has firmly incorporated both of these conditions. The first condition of division of authority was established through the Constitution of 1978. “Article 62 describes the king as supreme commander of the armed forces. Article 97 states that the Government directs defence policy and military administration and Article 149.1.4 give ‘the state’ exclusive competence over defence and the armed forces.”⁸¹ The second condition of rebuilding the reputation and respect of the military is demonstrated through the trust the populace has placed in the hands of a military that once believed their focus was internal

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 26.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 27.

rather than external. Today the military looks outward to defend the nation against outside threat, not inward to regime defense. As discussed in Chapter III, Spain has been demonstrating this external role through participation in IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia. Additionally, Spain has participated in several UN missions around the world in the last few years. Defense spending has been cut back in Spain for the same reasons as the other Western European countries, because of the end of the Cold War, not because of a lack of trust or the belief that the military is unnecessary. Again, as discussed in Chapter III, defense spending must increase to accommodate the greater need with membership in the integrated military command structure of NATO.

The three new members have already established the separation of authority. Each country has instituted its own type of defense reform and incorporated laws pertaining to the control and use of the military. The aspect of restoration of military prestige and trustworthiness is truly one where the three members can look to Spain. While they have a long history of the military forces being tied to the Communist Party, a leftist dictatorship, Spain's military was tied to a rightist dictatorship.

In all of these ways, Spain can be viewed as heartening example of how positive and prosperous the future can be as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The transition to democracy and preparation for NATO membership is difficult under the best of circumstances (such as peaceful instead of violent regime changes). The three new NATO members can look to Spain, not as an ideal, but as a model for the transition process to join the Western world.

⁸¹ Paul Heywood, *The Government and Politics of Spain*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), p. 53.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter I, numerous questions were posed that needed to be answered about Spain and how these answers might be important for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Throughout the succeeding chapters this thesis has tried to answer those questions as they pertain to Spain and to point out the similarities between Spain and the three new members.

Why did Spain decide that it wanted to join NATO?

Chapter I reviewed how for many years, General Franco desired the respectability that NATO membership offered. Additionally, Franco viewed NATO as a way into Western Europe. Even though Franco's Spain never joined NATO, numerous bilateral agreements between Spain and the United States started Spain on the path to Western European integration.

Chapter II discussed how the first government after the death of Franco hoped that being a member of NATO would help to solidify their fledgling democracy and bring the country into the world market. It was thought that NATO membership would also improve their status in the eyes of what was at the time the European Community, known today as the European Union. Additionally, this membership would lend direction to the Spanish military that was in such upheaval after the major changes in the system to which they were accustomed. After many years of NATO membership, it is known that all of these objectives transpired so these reasons for membership were feasible.

Then there were those in the opposite camp (also discussed in Chapter II) who did not want NATO membership. For many years they spoke out strongly against becoming

involved in a military 'war-making' organization. The fear was that NATO would cause Spain to participate in conflicts that were outside Spain's area of concern.

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland appear to have similar reasons for joining NATO. They want to ensure the consolidation of their respective democracies as well as enjoy the security that NATO offers its members. This similarity should invite the three to view Spain's success with encouragement for their own success.

Why did the Socialist Party (PSOE) change its stance on NATO after it had been elected?

The Socialist Party, after they were in office, saw the advantages of remaining and the disadvantages of leaving NATO. One principal reason for continuing NATO membership was the hope that remaining in NATO would solidify the democratization process, primarily in the military. Additionally, another factor for remaining in the Organization was the fear that leaving NATO would cause the European Economic Community to look unfavorably on Spain. This point leads to the next question.

Was NATO just a means to enter the European Economic Community?

While Spain greatly desired membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), NATO membership was not a condition for membership in the EEC, and as such it would be unnecessary for Spain to join NATO for this reason. Furthermore, while Spain's government feared leaving NATO would cause the EEC to look unfavorably on Spain, this would have been because Spain abandoned the Organization once they were members, not because this membership was necessary. Joining NATO is not now and never was a means to enter the EEC.

While the PSOE change in position may not be relevant to the three new members, the fact that there were people who opposed NATO entry and then reversed their position may be pertinent. Also, the European Union (EU) question is obviously not an issue for Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland since the EU has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate for accession with countries that were not invited to join NATO such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Was Spain hoping to control its military through NATO membership?

NATO membership would not have been the way to control the military since Spain did not join NATO until 1982 and by this time the country had been a democracy for more than five years, and it had already dealt successfully with the attempted ‘golpe’ of the government. The government had proven its ability to control the military. Perhaps a better question would be “*Was Spain hoping to provide effective direction for its military through NATO membership?*” This question then could be answered affirmatively as described in Chapter III.

In the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, NATO stated that in order to join NATO, nations must have effective control of their military. This means the new members must already have had their military under control before they became members. As in the case of Spain, the rewording of the question to include ‘providing effective direction’ for the military is more appropriate.

Summary

As discussed throughout Chapter IV, Spain offers Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland many lessons to emulate. The first lesson is in international relations and how

influence from outside sources cannot be allowed to persuade a country to take actions that are not in the best interest of the country. This refers to the control that the Soviet Union attempted to exert over Spain during the pre-integration to NATO period.

The next lesson is in the area of adaptation of the military to democratic rule. Not only does the military organization have to be revamped and updated to eliminate an overabundance of senior personnel from the previous regime, usually sheer numbers must be reduced to form a force of manageable size and quality. The military must also be NATO adaptable if the country desires membership.

The additional lessons of consolidation of democratic institutions, economic restructuring, general involvement in Western systems, and civilian control of the armed forces must be acknowledged by Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The establishment and ongoing adherence to these conditions is what has served Spain so well in its transformation from an authoritarian regime (under Generalissimo Franco) to the free market liberal democracy that it is today.

Perhaps the most important lesson that Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland can learn from Spain is that NATO membership can be taken slowly. Everything does not have to be accomplished at once. While Spain took an inordinate amount of time to become fully integrated in all aspects of NATO, the three new members do not have to try to do everything at once. Upgrades in military personnel and equipment can be made over time as long as the minimum standards are maintained. While the minimum should not ever be the goal, total adaptation to NATO standards does not have to be completed overnight. The most important aspect of all is a country's willingness and ability to adapt

to the minimum basic standards and their willingness to share the burdens and responsibilities of NATO membership.

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